Against Identity Politics
What would Trump do? The Israeli leader has long marketed himself as an essential diplomatic asset. That pitch is wearing thin. Netanyahu is in a different league , the ads read. The crowd that warm fall evening seemed enthusiastic, as did many French film critics. It will not, as of now, be shown in the United States. The president of the United States reportedly sought the help of a foreign government against an American citizen who might challenge him for his office.
This is the single most important revelation in a scoop by The Wall Street Journal , and if it is true, then President Donald Trump should be impeached and removed from office immediately. Until now, there was room for reasonable disagreement over impeachment as both a matter of politics and a matter of tactics. The Mueller report revealed despicably unpatriotic behavior by Trump and his minions, but it did not trigger a political judgment with a majority of Americans that it warranted impeachment. The Democrats, for their part, remained unwilling to risk their new majority in Congress on a move destined to fail in a Republican-controlled Senate.
The move follows a sudden shift in the Democratic caucus over the past week, as allegations that the president pressured Ukraine to boost his reelection prospects swirled. Many previously reticent Democrats, chief among them Pelosi herself, have changed their mind and now support an inquiry. The question was always when a critical mass of Democrats would coalesce in favor.
But then I found myself in need of help. All they wanna do is get people in trouble! It was typical button-pushing from the comedian: a hot take wrapped in a crude insult, delivered loudly and enthusiastically.
Against Identity Politics by Francis Fukuyama | Foreign Affairs
Usually, though, he follows up such bits with actual introspection. The U. Physical-education programs were designed to encourage health and fitness, but they may be counterproductive. Share Tweet. Emily Buder Sep 23, Most Popular Presented by. Updated on September 24, at p. Bibliography of Books Articles and Dissertations. Concentrating on . See also Moore For Online Resources go here. David Steinberg.
Steinberg houseofdavid. All the listed books were published in London unless otherwise indicated. British in India — Cultural-Psychological Issues. Indian Response - Indian Nationalism.
Indian Response - Muslims and Other Minorities. Issues, Aspects and Institutions of the British Raj. Economic and Social Issues. British Indian Administration. Company Raj — British Raj. East India Company Rule, Constitution — General. Allen, C. Reprinted in Origins of nationality in South Asia: patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India , Oxford University Press, Bhattacharya, S.
New York: George Braziller, Book Description. Brown , Judith M. Note — Review by C. Butler , L. Chopra, P. Cohn, B. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger eds. Dirks, Nicholas B. Winter, , pp. Guha, Ranajit ed. Book description. Keswani, K. House, Note review by McLane, John R. Spring, , pp. Louis, Wm. Ludden, David E. MacLeod, Roy M. Mahar, J. Majumdar, R. I, vol. Bombay, Mehra, Parshotam.
A dictionary of modern Indian history, Moore , R. Patterson, Steven H. Brief description. Rudolph, Lloyd I. Sarkar, Sumit, Modern India , Macmillan. Das in Social Scientist , Vol. Sen, Siba Pada, ed. Dictionary of National Biography. Calcutta , Institute of Historical Studies, Spear , Percival, A History of India vol. Wolpert, Stanley A. Reprinted in Origins of nationality in South Asia: patriotism and ethical government in the making of modern India , Oxford University Press, , pp.
See note. Cohn, Bernard S. XXIV, No. Note review by D. Low in Modern Asian Studies , Vol. Wansbrough , pp. Lorenzen, David N. ISSN: Metcalf, Thomas R. Brown and Modern India, Moore, R. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 4 1 : Ray, Rajat K. Note many references. Seal, Anil. Studdert-Kennedy, Gerald. Note — the Introduction includes a review of the development of the historiography of the Raj as it developed through the 20 th century. Tomlinson, B. Mode r n Asian Studies [G r eat Br itain] 19 3 : ISSN: X. Summary conclusion. Winks, Robin, ed. Arnold, David.
Brief summary. August, Thomas G. Ballhatchet, Kenneth. New York: St. Martin's Press, Reviewed by T. Metcalfe, Journal of Interdisciplinary History , Vol. Spring , pp. Bearce, George D. Thesis University of British Columbia, Bose, Nemai Sadhan. Racism, Struggle for Equality and Indian Nationalism. Note — This book deals exclusively with the Illbert episode. Bridge, Carl and Brasted, Howard. Bridge, Carl, and Fedorowich, Kent, eds. The British world: diaspora, culture, and identity. London; Portland, OR: F. Cass, Brown, Hilton. Chamberlain, M. Devon, U. Chaudhuri, Nupur. Victorian Studies 31 4 : Chowdhry, Prem.
Indian Historical Review [India] 29 : Hobsbawm, E. Collingham, E. Collini, S. Compton, J. Cornell, Louis L. Kipling in India , MacMillan, Murray, Dewey, C. Embree, Ainslie Thomas, Juergensmeyer, Mark ed. Ghose, Indira ed. Ghosh, S. Leiden , Greenberger, Allen J. Gregory, Robert G.
Gupta, Partha Sarathi. Imperialism and the British labour movement, , Macmillan, Hasseler, Theresa A. Hirschman, E. Note — conclusion quoted from book p. The Anglo-Indian campaign backfired, however. The crisis which they provoked exposed concealed weaknesses in what had appeared as a stable, well-run, durable structure. It showed that empire unable to resolve the conflicting claims of Europeans and 'Westernized' Indians. It left the three principal parties—the Government of India, nonofficial Europeans, and educated Indians—suspicious and antagonistic toward each other.
This lasting rift, this poisoned atmosphere, led to the founding of the Indian National Congress two years later and the eventual end of empire. In this way the Anglo-Indians helped to bring about what they wanted least. The Anglo-Indians, in their self-serving mythology, often claimed that British rule was based on the sword.
Actually, it was based on a subtle mixture of force and cooperation, of bluff and tact. It rested on the acquiescence, or at least the indifference, of the vast majority of Indians. They claimed that the raj was smoothly-running, stable, and benevolent, but their 'white mutiny' exposed the kinks in the machinery, the instability of abrasive group conflicts, and the mischief of the imperial relationship.
The Indians eventually disposed of it. Houghton, Walter E. New Haven, Hume, John Chandler Jr. Hutchins , Francis G. Hyam, Ronald. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History , 14 2 : Inden, Ronald B. Jayawardena, K. Jeffery, Roger. Modern Asian Studies , 13 2 : Kincaid, Dennis C.
British Social Life in India , , Kobor, Kelli Michele, Orientalism, the construction of race, and the politics of identity in British India, Kopf, D. However, the Fund was always about more than just medicine; it played a significant political role at a highly delicate stage in the development of British rule in India. Quoted from History Today site. Book description and brief review. Lewis , Martin D.
Magan, J. Mangan, J. Mannoni, O. Powesland with a foreword by Philip Mason. Publisher New York ; Washington : Praeger, Edition 2nd ed. Marshall , P. Martin, Gregory. Mason, Philip. The Men Who Ruled India. New York, Common Sense About Race Relations , Mayo, Katherine; Mrinalini Sinha ed. Metcalfe , Thomas R. Mukherjee, S.
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Brief review. For Churchill, empires were primarily a means of stabilizing international relations, creating zones of free trade, and expanding the rule of law beyond national borders. Peers, Douglas M. Parry, Benita. Procida, Mary A. Renford, R. Rizvi, G. Reynolds, Reginald. White Sahibs in India. Robb, Peter, Top of Form. Robinson, Amy Elizabeth , Ph. Examining these encounters …. The imperial polity was in reality a vast, porous, and irregular space composed of networks, rather than neatly defined geographic areas, with direct lines between colony and colony or colony and metropole.
Many British colonial subjects--in distress or otherwise--learned to utilize the shape and nature of the imperial polity to their own advantage. From the abstract. Ross, Robert ed. Sen, R. Sen, Sudipta. South Asia [Australia] 24 Special Issue : Singh, P. Chronicle of the British Indian Association, , Calcutta Spear, Percival. The Nabobs, Oxford University Press, Studdert-Kennedy, G.
Providence and the Raj, Thornton, Note — the Introduction includes a valuable review of the development of the historiography of the Raj as it developed through the 20 th century. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History , 33 3 : Wurgaft, Lewis D. Journal of Indian History [India] 62 : Akbar, M. Nehru: The Making of India, Viking, Aloysius, G.
Arnold, D. Bakshi, S. Besant, A. Birla, G.
Bondurant, Joan Valerie. Conquest of violence: the Gandhian philosophy of conflict. Princeton: Oxford University Press, Bose, A. Indian Historical Review [India] 12 : Bose, N. The Indian Awakening and Bengal. Calcutta, , Govt. Calcutta, Brass, P.
South Asia [Australia] 11 2 : Broomfield, J. Brown, Judith M. Note — major review by James G. Hart in Philosophy East and West, Jan. Chakrabarti, D. Congress in Evolution. Calcutta: The Book Company, I, , Delhi, Chandra, Bipan, et al.tesciadunnbungoo.tk
Nationalistic Narratives in Pakistani Textbooks
New Delhi: Orient Longman, Chandra ed. Chatterjee, D. Das and Indian National Movement , Calcutta, Chatterjee, Partha, The Nation and its Fragments, - reviews. Chirol, Valentine. Indian Unrest, Macmillan, Copland, Ian. South Asia [Australia] 8 : Copley, Antony, Gandbi, Oxford, Blackwell, Cumpston, M. Erikson, Erik H. Note — The author claims that Mansergh and Lumby did not have access to one key category of documentation — the Indian Political Intelligence archives - when preparing their magisterial work. French did use these archives and therein lies the interest of this book.
An Autobiography, Boston, B rief review. These Hindu reform movements harkened back to a Vedic golden age and sought to revive this era of cultural greatness. To do so, they executed a dual strategy of stigmatization and emulation. At the same time, these movements sought to reform Hinduism along modern lines by addressing issues such as the inequitable caste system, the maltreatment of women, idolatry, and polytheism. These reforms, it was believed, would help provide a bulwark against external challenges by modernizing Hinduism without sacrificing its fundamental religious tenets.
Eventually, these reform movements transitioned into pro-Hindu interest groups that exerted pressure on the Congress Party from within. Leaders of this strident faction went on to found the Hindu Mahasabha in , initially as a pressure group within the Congress Party and later as a separate political entity. The organization began as an offshoot of the Mahasabha but soon developed its own independent identity. Among Hindu nationalists, opinions differed over the best way of revitalizing Hinduism.
Hedgewar formed the RSS as a cultural, rather than political, body with the sole purpose of strengthening Hindu society by building civic character, unifying Hindus divided by caste, and enhancing their physical strength through training and exercises. In short, the RSS was established as a bottom-up vehicle for fortifying Hindu society. Shortly after India secured independence, the catalyst that prompted this shift was the drafting of a series of Hindu code bills that aimed to reform Hindu personal laws governing issues ranging from marriage to property rights.
For much of its existence, the BJS was a minor electoral player—especially when compared to the dominant Congress Party—that struggled to connect with Indian voters on a pan-national basis. The twenty-one-month period of emergency rule instituted by Indira Gandhi in , in the wake of mass protests against Gandhi and Congress Party rule, was a critical turning point. Many key opposition actors, including leading figures affiliated with the Hindu right, were imprisoned or persecuted during this dark period in Indian history.
When Gandhi relented and announced the resumption of elections in , a coalition of opposition parties known as the Janata alliance—which included the BJS as a core member—were swept into power. Within two years, the Janata experiment collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. The opportunistic alliance, whose members were united in their distaste for the Congress Party but divided on matters of leadership and policy, was plagued by factionalism from the start.
Although the coalition was a failure, this brief stint in power nonetheless gave BJS leaders their first taste of governing. Electorally, the BJP initially struggled to make much of an impression, winning just two seats in the general elections. The party was internally divided over whether it should adopt a more militant stance or moderate its views to cater to disaffected Congress Party voters. The approaches of the two entities would soon converge, however. The latter party soon moved away from its initial moderate stance toward a more purposive platform of Hindu identity-building that could exploit a growing sense of Hindu vulnerability.
The dawn of the coalition era meant that the BJP continually oscillated between more militant and moderate stances, depending on prevailing political conditions. A critical development in the s was the ramping up of the Ramjanmabhoomi movement to reclaim the place where the Muslim holy site, the Babri Masjid, stood in Ayodhya to make way for the construction of a mandir temple marking the birthplace of the Hindu deity Ram.
In , the BJP president at the time, Lal Krishna Advani, led a monthlong yatra pilgrimage intended to further stoke the Hindu majoritarian agitation surrounding the Ram mandir issue, which had been instigated by the Sangh. The yatra led to a groundswell of support in favor of the Hindu nationalist cause but also trigged a deadly set of religious riots across the country.
This sustained campaign of ethnoreligious mobilization by the Sangh and its many affiliates paid rich political dividends for the BJP, which saw its political footprint spread. But, in , Vajpayee again became prime minister, this time commanding a more stable coalition government that allowed him to complete a full term in office. Hindutva certainly did not disappear, but the coalition arrangement compelled the BJP to deemphasize many controversial social issues that might raise the hackles of its friends and partners.
Gujarat, for instance, became a flashpoint for communal tensions as Hindu-Muslim riots engulfed parts of the state under the watch of then chief minister Modi. In the general election, the BJP unexpectedly lost power, paving the way for a decade of renewed Congress Party rule in New Delhi. The electoral verdict represented a breakthrough for the BJP and the broader Hindutva ecosystem, the likes of which many insiders had doubted was possible.
After that, its vote share had steadily declined, slumping to 19 percent in Fourth, the presidential nature of the election and the popular mandate in support of Modi as a candidate gave the BJP and its allies in the Hindu nationalist movement a unique opportunity to shape policies in a way that previous BJP leaders at the state and national levels simply lacked. It is true that the campaign was not primary fought on issues at the center of the Hindutva agenda.
The BJP made this strategic calculation to appeal broadly to Indian voters and help the party transcend its historically narrow base. However, that certainly does not mean that Hindu nationalist themes were absent from the campaign trail; on the contrary, these messages were deployed in a targeted manner in contexts and geographies where the BJP believed it could benefit from using them.
Modi himself routinely attacked the Congress Party for pandering to Muslims by promising them special treatment, and he often embraced Hindu symbols and personalities to extract maximum political mileage. In parts of Uttar Pradesh, especially in western areas around Muzaffarnagar that had witnessed ethnic violence between Hindus and Muslims in , the BJP did not shy away from communally polarizing rhetoric.
Similarly, in the border state of Assam, the party used the sensitive issue of Bangladeshi migration as a wedge to shore up its support. This emphasis on the economy also opened the door to new constituencies who may not have been attracted to a purely majoritarian BJP approach. First, while many political parties in India invoke religious symbols for political purposes, the BJP espouses a distinct worldview that intrinsically favors one religious community—Hindus—over all others.
It was the first time since independence that a party other than the Congress Party had achieved such a decisive mandate. Since then, the BJP has methodically expanded its footprint across the country. To put this number in perspective, the BJP controlled just five states as recently as Furthermore, the party then never before enjoyed the popularity or reach that it does today. Exploiting an economic downturn between and —which was compounded by allegations of grand corruption against the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance UPA government and a pervasive sense of policy paralysis—and touting a charismatic new leader in Modi, the BJP soared to new heights.
Since coming to power, Modi has remade the party in his image—with the assistance of his longtime aide and handpicked choice for BJP party president, Amit Shah. Modi and Shah quickly moved to cement their hold over the party apparatus by marginalizing any alternative power centers. On the one hand, Modi dedicated many of his formative years to the Hindu nationalist cause.
At twenty-one years old, Modi joined the ranks of the RSS, the ideological fountainhead of the Hindu nationalist movement in India and the parent organization of the BJP, as a pracharak campaigner. While the RSS and the BJP are legally separate entities, they share an especially close form of collaboration under the present dispensation. Many high-ranking ministers cut their teeth in the service of the RSS or other entities linked to the Sangh Parivar. In addition, there are regularly scheduled coordination meetings in which BJP and RSS officials meet to discuss policy issues of the day.
On the other hand, many other actors within the Sangh bristle at the outsize leadership of Modi. As Christophe Jaffrelot has argued, the Sangh has traditionally given priority to institutional considerations over personal equations; its collectivist ethos and beliefs militate against a single charismatic leader placing himself over the organization. Since , the Indian government has banned the RSS on three separate occasions for allegedly fomenting extremist sentiments and violating constitutional principles.
The BJP has long advanced the notion that the Congress Party and other so-called secular parties have engaged in pseudo-secularism rather than genuine secularism. In other words, they allege that secular parties have adopted a holier-than-thou approach as if they are above religious considerations.
Many liberal voices openly agree with this assessment: this state of affairs does not discredit secularism per se as much as it does the way in which secularism has been employed by opportunistic parties. Secular arrogance describes the notion that political power can be used either to co-opt or to marginalize religious voices. To defeat the popular Akali Dal in Punjab, a political party largely comprised of moderate Sikhs, she accommodated Sikh religious extremists, such as the fundamentalist preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale.
The denouement of this debacle was the eventual assassination of Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards, which triggered bloody anti-Sikh pogroms across Delhi in which several prominent Congress politicians were implicated. The strategy largely paid off as the Congress Party made big gains in the predominately Hindu Jammu region. However, the gambit ultimately proved costly as the cynical ploy helped sow further divisions between Hindus and Muslims in the troubled state. Secular ignorance, on the other hand, refers to situations in which politicians can easily entangle themselves in religious debates even as they try to ensure an equal distance from all faiths.
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