This Subprogramme is formulated to cover a broad range of RR issues and to promote the continued development of scientific research and technological development using RRs. From the traditional support of fundamental research and training, the focus of the Subprogramme has recently moved to helping facilities with strategic planning to increase use in more sustainable areas 12 of The Subprogramme supports regional and interregional thematic collaborations, networking and centres of excellence for enhanced utilization of RRs.
To contribute to non-proliferation efforts worldwide, support of RERTR and the programmes of returning of RR fuel to the country of origin has been strengthened.
To address RR support needed for the evolutionary and innovative nuclear power reactors and fuel cycles, the subprogramme promotes international collaboration to assess projected needs, with a long term time horizon, for RRs on a global and regional basis.
Funding reductions and limited succession planning have strained available resources of a number of RRs, pressurising many facilities to pursue commercial activities to remain in operation. It is in this context that modern RRs are to be used to conduct advanced research in support of innovative nuclear development in most cases to very aggressive schedules and training. To support the scientific, educational and commercial demands being placed in present times on RRs, a new project addressing RR Operation, Maintenance, Availability and Reliability has been initiated in The main objectives of the RRs Subprogramme are: To increase the capabilities of interested Member States to safely and reliably carry out scientific research and technology development at RRs, conduct ageing management, decommissioning, refurbishment and modernization; and To enhance the potential of interested Member States to plan new facilities when needed, to cope with RR fuel cycle issues and reduce proliferation risks by conversion from Highly Enriched Uranium HEU to Low Enriched Uranium LEU of RRs cores and targets used for radioisotope production, and to repatriate fuel to the country of origin.
Subprogramme on RRs D. Their contribution to the education and training of scientists and engineers for the whole nuclear community is well documented. In addition they have played an important role in development of science and technology, in the production of isotopes for medicine and industry, in non-destructive testing of materials, in analytical studies, in the modification of materials, in research in various areas of science and in support of nuclear power programmes.
The sharing of resources will increase the utilization on the one hand and on the other hand pave the way for the decommissioning of underutilized ageing reactors, without depleting knowledge base and human resources. We give here an overview of this project formulated to cover the broad range of possible applications and to promote the continued development of scientific research and technological development using RRs.
The main objectives of this project are: To enhance RR utilization in Member States for many practical applications, such as isotope production, neutron radiography, neutron beam research and material characterization and testing consistent with RR features; and To increase cooperation between different RR centres. In addition, publication of technical documents based on the output of CRPs and TMs will help in disseminating knowledge and capacity building for RR operators and users Project D.
Similarly, IAEA assistance is requested when new RRs or major innovative systems, such as in-core loops or cold sources, are being planned or constructed. Regional and interregional thematic collaborations, networking and centres of excellence are being increasingly considered worldwide as an appropriate way to enhance utilization of RRs. This project is designed to fulfil these needs by collecting and sharing relevant information, including best practices and lessons learned.
The main objective of this project is: To increase the competence of interested Member States to plan and implement large scale refurbishment and modernization of RRs, and to plan and implement construction of new RRs or major RR systems. Some of the activities proposed to be carried out under this project are: Develop regional RR networks and centres of excellence; 14 of IAEA efforts have included the development and maintenance of several data bases with information related to RRs and RR spent fuel inventories that have been essential in planning and managing both RERTR and spent fuel return programmes.
Therefore the continued safe, reliable and economic handling, management and storage of RRSNF of all types, standard, failed and experimental, is a serious issue for almost all Member States with RRs. Many Member States, especially those having RRs but no power reactors, are expressing concerns about final disposition of RR spent nuclear fuel. Non-proliferation and environmental concerns associated with RRSNF have become just as important, if not more so, as the above mentioned technical concerns.
This project is designed to address these issues. The main objective of this project is: To strengthen the capability of interested Member States having RRs to deal with all fuel cycle issues including fuel development, fabrication and qualification, mitigation of identified health, and environmental vulnerabilities associated with spent fuel management; and to promote conversion from HEU to LEU, repatriation of spent fuel to its country of origin, and regional solutions to the back end of the fuel cycle.
Some of the activities proposed to be carried out under this project are: Maintain a database on spent fuel from research and test reactors, publish summary statistics periodically; Provide advice and assistance as requested to RRs with corroded or otherwise degraded spent fuel; Support spent fuel assessment teams for the preparation for shipment of RR spent fuel; Update the RR core conversion guidebook to include conversion to high density U-Mo fuels; Prepare a technical document on good practices for the management and storage of RR spent fuel; Update the guidelines documents on the technical and administrative procedures required for the shipment of spent fuel; Support national projects on RR fuel and fuel cladding; Prepare a technical document on the economic aspects of the RR nuclear fuel cycle; Support activities related to RR conversion and return of RR spent fuel to the country of origin; 15 of Within the broader range of nuclear facilities, the decommissioning of RRs presents some unique features including experimental devices, unusual materials, and often proximity to populated areas.
A lot of RRs are situated in Member States not having adequate resources for the decommissioning of their reactors. Decommissioning is the inevitable legacy of operation of RRs and needs timely and effective management. This includes management of the materials that result from the decommissioning project. In many instances the radiation damage mechanisms of core materials, especially after high fluences are poorly understood.
With many RRs now beginning to decommission or undergoing extensive refurbishment, it has been pointed out that an opportunity to take samples from the core materials and to study their microstructures is being squandered. Besides providing valuable information for decommissioning waste management, the life extension of RRs and input for improved materials for new reactors, the promotion of information exchange and effective coordinated research effort in this area has the potential to increase the understanding of fundamental ageing mechanisms of reactor structural materials.
The main objectives of this project are: To increase the capability in interested Member States with RRs to plan and implement decommissioning; and To improve understanding of the ageing of irradiated materials and advanced materials for reactor core applications.
Some of the activities proposed to be carried out under this project are: Prepare a technical report on decommissioning of RRs and other small nuclear facilities under constrained resources; Prepare a technical document on how to make use of samples from the cores of decommissioning or refurbishing reactors to improve understanding of ageing irradiated core materials; Prepare a technical document on cost estimates for decommissioning of RRs; Prepare a technical report on pool side inspection of RR fuel; and Coordinate a CRP on ageing of irradiated reactor core materials Project D.
Many older facilities have been decommissioned, permanently shutdown, or are faced with probable shutdown in the very near future. Funding reductions and limited succession planning have strained available resources, pressuring many facilities to pursue commercial activities to remain in operation. It is in this context that modern RRs are being tasked to conduct advanced research in support of innovative nuclear development in most cases to very aggressive schedules and training. To support the scientific, educational and commercial demands being placed 16 of This project aims to fulfil these requests by documenting good practices and lessons learnt as an element for strengthening the operational management.
Some of the activities proposed to be carried out under this project are: Prepare a technical document on RR availability and reliability; Prepare a technical report on RR quality management system development; Coordinate a CRP on on-line monitoring systems for RRs; and Support TC projects involving operation, maintenance, availability and reliability improvements. All managerial areas involved in the operation of the above listed types of facilities are included in the scope of the TWGRR.
The TWGRR will give the necessary attention to all of its relevant aspects, including operation, utilization, nuclear fuel cycle, maintenance, refurbishment, modernization, quality assurance, new designs and decommissioning. When considered appropriated, to provide guidance in order to define actions for reactors that have been placed in shutdown condition; To identify relevant issues and topics which might increase cooperation among different RR centres, particularly in various regions of the world; To encourage and facilitate regional and international collaborative programmes in the construction and utilization of RRs, and to be a forum for discussion of issues related to impediments and challenges that can be faced by the concept of a regional RR park; To propose the realization of events that will work as a forum for the exchange of information among the participants in all areas indicated in 4.
Such events include, technical meetings, workshops, international symposiums and conferences; To address the projected needs for RRs on a global and regional basis with a long-term time horizon; and To encourage participation of young professionals, as appropriate, in IAEA activities Membership Members of the TWG on RRs shall be appointed by the Deputy Director General, for Nuclear Energy, following consultation with the respective national authorities or organizations. There shall be appropriate representation on the Group from RR operators, fuel cycle, materials specialists, designers of RRs, researchers and users of RRs; Are to serve for a standard length of four years; Shall participate in the Group in their personal capacity and shall provide as appropriate views on national policies and strategies in the technical field; and May as appropriate bring experts to provide additional information and share experience in the meetings of the TWG.
The report shall be also published on the WEB in a format and content agreeable to all members. Extraordinary meetings may be called when required. In order to address increasingly important non-proliferation concerns, emphasis is put on the support of Member States' work in the framework of the GTRI on RR core conversion from HEU to LEU, conversion from HEU to LEU of targets used for radioisotope production, the repatriation of RR fuels to the country of origin, and the global clean out of RR fissile material, including experimental or exotic fuels and sources.
To help achieving an enhanced utilization of RRs, the subprogramme supports the establishment of regional and interregional thematic collaborations, networking and centres of excellence. To address the issue of RR support for evolutionary and innovative nuclear power reactors and fuel cycles, the subprogramme promotes international collaboration to assess projected needs over the long term for RRs on a global and regional basis.
To support the scientific, educational and commercial demands being placed at present on RRs, a new project on RR operation, maintenance, availability and reliability has been initiated in The new TWGRR will provide a unique forum for information and knowledge sharing on national and international programmes in all technical areas of RR and will provide advice and guidance for implementation of the IAEA's programmatic activities in those areas. Goldman, P. Adelfang and I. Goldman, N. Ramamoorthy, and P. Adelfang, I. Goldman, A.
Soares and E. The last tenyear safety reviews of the high-flux reactor were held in and The first review followed the replacement of the reactor block. The second focused on the installations' compliance with new Safe Shutdown Earthquake standards 0,6g at 6 Hz , with a major refit programme from to During this period reactor operations could nevertheless be maintained for days per year, and the new Key Reactor Components programme was launched.
In addition, neutronic studies were performed with a view to reducing the consumption of uranium and being able to explore conversion. In parallel to, and beyond, the refit, the performance of ILL's experimental facilities is being enhanced through the long-term on-going Millennium Programme.
Finally, in order to attract more and more scientists to the ILL, ESRF and EMBL, the three institutes are together pushing for a development of their joint site, as well as promoting partnerships for science and technology. ILL is thus ensuring both its users and funders that its reactor remains in state-of-the-art condition; we are now ready for 20 more years of operation, ensuring a reliable flux of quality neutrons for investigative purposes.
Introduction This presentation develops the following items: Previous refurbishment of the reactor replacement of the Reactor Block Refit programme Four parallel year investment programmes: o The renewal of key reactor components; o The provision of new moderators, instruments and techniques; o The creation of Partnerships for Science and Technology; o The partnership to develop the overall site.
These programmes assume that the lifetime of the Institute will extend at least to and probably beyond. The very high flux delivered by the HFR makes possible specific high performance experiments, such as: Magnetic structure determination under hydrostatic pressure conditions above 7 GPa , Diffraction studies for minute sample volumes less than 0, mm , Physical measurements on atoms which present a large nucleon excess, Actinide transmutation in compliance with French regulations on nuclear waste management.
Neutrons provide a powerful tool for investigating nature at all levels, from testing theories about the evolution of the universe to elucidating the complex processes of life. The ILL offers experimental facilities and expertise covering all these areas: Chemistry and materials catalysts, pharmaceuticals, hydrogen-storage materials, environmentallyfriendly fuels, earth science , Engineering operation of engines and efficient combustion, composite materials, welding and surface treatments Previous refurbishment of the reactor The main steps have been: A new vertical cold source equipped with a vertical and curved guide tube connected with a turbine.
This device feeds ultracold neutrons to the experimental instruments. It has been positioned in the front part of a horizontal beam tube. It feeds the second guide hall ILL of Some minor modifications were introduced in the light of experience: the thermocouples were secured in position; the central thermocouple now has improved heat resistance; the design has been simplified by eliminating a redundant thermocouple. The source works perfectly at C, and its three beam lines are highly appreciated by the researchers.
This has extended its service life, allowing extended reactor operations and reduced radiation exposure for workers. Throughout the period of this major refit the ILL was able to maintain user service with three day reactor cycles per year. The work included: Reinforcement of the transfer canal Deconstruction of the concrete structures on the upper floor of the reactor, including the nuclear ventilation system 3 new ventilation units to replace the old one Comb connexion between the slab upper floor and the concrete containment, securing the slab to the containment wall rather than to the wall of the reactor pool, thus reducing stresses New seismically qualified circuits: new seismic trip channels, safety valves, leak-tight containment penetrations Modification of the buildings surrounding the reactor: the office building has been reinforced and the front part of the guide halls has been sectioned to avoid contact with the reactor Doubling of the protection circuits Significant reinforcement of security measures malevolence and theft.
The main focus of this programme is on: o o Safety rods, 12 new safety rods, project for a new design on-going Vertical cold source: renewal of the instrumentation and digital control system and of the pressure-resistant housings; addition of a new mimic panel in the control room accomplished during the Refit Programme, taking advantage of the long shutdown 25 of This would allow us to take advantage of the package of design tools "Coeur", in collaboration with the CEA.
We could then explore and assess the possibilities of using lowly-enriched uranium when it becomes available ongoing 26 of Creation of partnerships for science and technology by capitalising upon the experience of the Partnership for Structural Biology PSB laboratory: o Partnerships for soft condensed matter, for materials science and engineering o An Advanced Neutron Technology Centre surrounded by private engineering companies o Partnership for high magnetic fields ILL and ESRF. Conclusion Pushing safety, technological quality and experimental performance, ILL is thus guaranteeing that its reactor, its instruments and its environment remain in state-of-the-art condition; ILL is now ready for 20 more years of operation, ensuring a reliable flux of neutrons for the scientific community.
The contactor, INVAP SE, provided significant in-house resources as well as project managing an international team of suppliers and sub-contractor deliver the project s objectives. Commissioning was undertaken in accordance with the IAEA recommended stages.
3-9-12222 | 2nd announcement EAN Workshop
The main results of hot commissioning are reviewed and the problems encountered examined. Operational experience since hot commissioning is also reviewed. This paper presents, and reflects on with the benefit of hindsight, the approaches used to define the project requirements, choose the supplier and deliver the project, emphasising those good practices that contributed to the project success. Project Planning, Organisation and Implementation 2. That is, the contractor would not only be responsible for the performance of systems such as process and electrical, but would be responsible for ensuring the delivery of neutrons of the required spectra at the required flux to the required size and number of beam and irradiation facilities.
It took a while for some of ANSTO s stakeholders to embrace this performance-based approach and the general feedback that we had from the then potential contractors was that this was a novel approach. The effect was that ANSTO gave significant flexibility to the contractor to produce a cost-effective design for the reactor that could achieve a high performance. Whilst the contract performance demonstration tests are yet to be completed, the results to date do not suggest that any of performance requirements will not be achieved. Some of these were obvious, for example government federal, state and local , users, operators and the local community, but others were less obvious, for example what did ANSTO s public relations group want to be able to achieve?
We identified all their expectations, worked towards meeting them, and communicated with them regularly throughout the project. An example of this was that members of the project team met regularly with members of the local community in an open forum which allowed concerns to be addressed. While we had some early opposition from committed anti-nuclear groups, the local government organisation, and a few individuals of the local community, we have maintained strong broad stakeholder support throughout the project. In the main round tenderers were required to submit sufficient information by way of conceptual design and calculation to demonstrate that they had a design which was capable of delivering the required performance.
As it was recognised that this requirement would cause a significant cost to tenderers, the purpose of the prequalification round was to eliminate all tenderers who failed to convince ANSTO that they had a chance of being successful in the main tender round. From the tenderers point of view, this two stage approach was useful in the sense that before committing significant resources to the tender, the tenderers were assured by succeeding in the prequalification process that there was a level playing field, in which all prequalified tenderers had a priori equal chances of being selected.
Tender preparation was one of the most intensive parts of the project for the tenderers, whilst tender evaluation was a very intense part of the project for ANSTO. The tender process, from prequalification to contract signature took almost two years, with the first informative meeting for potential tenderers taking place in September , the prequalification being decided in December , the Request for Tender being issued in August , the tenders being lodged in December , the preferred tenderer being selected in June and the Contract being signed in July Key to the success of the project was that the Tender process assured that the principal s and contractor s goals were aligned: the main goal for the project for both ANSTO and INVAP was for OPAL to be a world class reactor in both radioisotope production and neutron research.
During manufacture, installation and pre-commissioning testing INVAP were responsible for the planning and conduct of all inspections and tests. However, the same ANSTO team of engineers and scientists who were responsible for the review and acceptance of designs provided independent witnessing of significant inspections and tests. With components being manufactured in Europe, North and South America, Asia and across a number of Australian states this required a significant commitment of ANSTO s resources, but this high level of independent QA has given significant confidence to ANSTO of the quality of the facility and has been essential in the management of regulatory expectations.
All the management plans, the detailed project program, based on a detailed Work Breakdown Structure, the assignment of responsibilities and the organisation chart were defined during the Tender process and submitted to ANSTO with the Tender. Efficient and frequent communications between the two organisations proved to be key to the project success.
INVAP use an integrated team approach for projects: the team responsible for preparing a tender stays with the project for its duration. As ANSTO used a similar approach, most participants in the project have had the opportunity to interact for several years. The Work Breakdown Structure was used for both project planning and progress control.
Formal risk management procedures proved to be valuable. Key to the success of the 31 of Three types of fuel assembly were loaded in the first core: g U without burnable poison BP g U with BP g U with BP OPAL standard fuel Nine of the full core sixteen fuel assemblies were loaded initially and for each subsequent fuel assembly loaded the control rods were withdrawn and the sub-critical multiplication factor determined. The reactor was taken critical on 12 August with fourteen fuel assemblies loaded as predicted.
The shutdown value of the First Shutdown System with single control rod failure was measured for this first critical core. The main issue during this testing stage was spurious trips from the nucleonics instrumentation due to electronic noise. This was resolved by close attention to earthing, connections and cable screening.
Stage B2 Commissioning The full core was loaded and 22 low power tests up to kW were carried out over 25 days to measure key nuclear and reactivity parameters of the core. The calculated power peaking factor 2. Wide range set point for rate enable occurred with detector in pulse mode where the signal is noisy.
The rate enable setpoint was raised as this was still within the safety case. Failure of a diesel starter motor during a test run. Main cause was identified to be a faulty battery. During this stage the reactor power was increased in steps up to full load 20 MW which was first achieved on 3 November Twenty four test procedures were used and more than seventy test records completed. The core outlet temperature sensors did not give a true indication of the core outlet temperature.
The primary coolant flow path around these detectors was modified and the problem solved. Cooling tower performance allowed the operation of the reactor at full power, but extrapolation to the design basis ambient conditions indicated that four of the five fans would not be sufficient for this heat load. The manufacturer has improved the fan performance and further tests are scheduled for March In addition to the CNS, Stage C testing of some of the irradiation facilities is still outstanding. Reactor Schedule The reactor successfully finished its first operating cycle on the 30 th of December , after 26 full power days.
Towards the end of the end of the first operating cycle, it was found that the isotopic purity of the heavy water in the reflector vessel is slowly reducing due to a light water leak. The source of the leak has been determined to be a non-structural seal weld associated with the neutron beam tube connection to the vessel. Different repair strategies are being investigated, but the reactor can continue to be operated at full power. The first reactor refuelling was completed in February. This core is calculated to have the highest PPF and the calculated value 2. The reactor is operating at full load 20 MW for testing of neutron beam instruments, commissioning of irradiation facilities and continuing carrying out the contract performance demonstration tests.
CNS commissioning is scheduled to restart mid March. Commissioning has proceeded to schedule without major problems. ANSTO is now looking forward to completing commissioning and moving into routine operation this year. Key to the success of the project were: Ongoing stakeholder commitment A very carefully designed and conducted tendering process Effective assignment of responsibilities through the contract Goal alignment between the principal and the supplier Strong cooperation, enhanced by frequent communications between the parties Integrated management teams, both within ANSTO and INVAP.
Formal management procedures, known, accepted and reviewed by the parties. Detailed program, used for both project programming and project control. The timely availability of a complete and fully trained operation crew. At the end of the day, any project is as good as the people participating in it. The rise of global terrorism has created a new demand for nuclear weapons and a new willingness to use them.
There is little doubt that if terrorists acquire nuclear weapons they will use them. Supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, the necessary materials to make a nuclear weapon, are widely dispersed around the world. Obtaining these essential ingredients is one of the hardest parts of making a nuclear weapon. Since these materials are difficult to make, the most likely way a terrorist organization will get them is through illicit purchase or theft. Terrorists will try to acquire nuclear material from wherever it is easiest to steal or from anyone willing to sell.
Terrorists won t necessarily look where there is the most material; they may go to the place where the material is the most vulnerable or accessible. Vulnerable nuclear material anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere.senjouin-kikishiro.com/images/kebycoj/3531.php
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Like most global problems, the defense against nuclear terrorism is dependent upon cooperative and collective global action. Key among these initiatives are UN Security Council Resolution ; the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials; the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the creation of the Nuclear Security Fund at the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA with its associated plan for assisting states with implementation of their security obligations, including through the creation of more detailed nuclear security guidelines.
While these initiatives form an important legal and institutional architecture, they still fall short. There are several key reasons that our existing global nuclear security architecture is not yet sufficient. These reasons include inadequate implementing mechanisms for existing 1 35 of While the various legal and voluntary initiatives described above are important for beginning to create necessary norms and legal frameworks, in very few cases have they been translated into actions.
The application of micro reactors to synthetic chemistry
UNSCR established a Committee to help review the reports required to be submitted by states, but the Committee is not equipped by either budget or staff to help states implement the requirements of the resolution. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials CPPNM has no implementing or oversight mechanism, and the Amendment to the Convention has not entered into force only seven of the 80 states required for its entry into force have ratified it.
The IAEA is also limited by its charter to working with states as opposed to industry for example , and its activities are generally limited to non-weapons materials and facilities. In addition, despite various bi- and multi-lateral mechanisms for nuclear security cooperation, a comprehensive, global approach to nuclear material security is still missing.
A global best practices organization could be the mechanism for raising the level of global best practices of nuclear materials security in a time urgent way, and serve as a tool for industry and operators who want to stay ahead of the threat. Such an organization could provide a forum for the exchange of experience, lessons learned, and new ideas at the grass roots facility-operations level: a forum for practitioners rather than policy makers.
In this way, the nuclear materials management community, and all of the partners involved in the organization can reduce the risk of a terrorist event that would threaten the viability of peaceful nuclear activities internationally. Potential Activities The primary role of a global best practices organization would be to provide a forum for the exchange of information between operators, industry, governments, and government entities regarding on-the-ground experiences and lessons learned in providing for the security of nuclear materials.
Through consultation with the international nuclear materials management community we have concluded that this core mission is not being done by any existing mechanism, and would be valuable to facility operators and managers.
Generation IV reactor
For reasons of staffing and financing, it is likely that WINS activities will start from a narrow focus and then broaden with time. It also may be difficult initially to directly involve some military materials or facilities, but nuclear weapons states' and non-npt states' facility operators and authorities could still participate broadly in the activities of the organization.
The process of expanding WINS activities will likely be driven by the confidence of the participants. An initial activity of WINS should be to collect best practices for nuclear material security. WINS will serve as a forum for operators and practitioners to share security strategies that go beyond internationally accepted standards to improve material security.
This is a significant and important achievement. In support of this effort, activities that would complement and supplement the Plan and assist the IAEA in realizing its nuclear security goals should be a major focus of WINS. It will be vital for WINS, in particular in the start-up phase, to work closely with the IAEA to avoid duplication of effort and therefore wasting of resources. Some of these areas could include working directly with facilities in the nuclear weapon states, working with non-civilian entities, conducting activities in non-npt states, and engaging directly with the nuclear industry, including with facilities and operators.
WINS has an important role to play in raising the international awareness of the need for increased attention to nuclear materials security. WINS can also contribute to establishing and building the resource base of experts and services for nuclear material security. These kinds of activities can benefit all groups and individuals working in the field. We believe WINS could also contemplate the conduct of peer reviews to be carried out on a voluntary basis, and designed to assist facilities in identifying ways that they can improve security implementation.
On the one hand, peer review might be one of the most sensitive and difficult activities for a new organization to undertake, and therefore might not be easily incorporated into the initial activities of WINS. However, the experience of the World Association of Nuclear Operators WANO , which focuses on nuclear safety, demonstrated that the conduct of peer reviews was important in shaping the activities of and support for the organization. Scope of Materials to be Addressed Defining the materials to be addressed by WINS activities will impact organizational priorities and shape activities and participation in the organization.
The global universe of nuclear materials and facility types is diverse. WINS could address all nuclear and 3 37 of We recommend that the decision on which materials to address should be based on a riskbased assessment that returns to the core rationale for establishing the organization. Under these terms, for example, WINS could define its initial goal as ensuring security of unirradiated direct use materials. WINS s ability to address the most sensitive materials in the category e. Nothing in the definition of this scope should be interpreted as limiting the range of membership and future activities of the organization.
Activities geared toward best practices in the management of material as defined above will naturally have potential application for less attractive material. Therefore, participation and information sharing with facilities responsible for other related nuclear and radiological materials should be supported and encouraged. WANO, for example, is organized primarily based on geographic location of the members. For a diverse participation, such as envisioned for WINS, it may prove valuable to organize participants around technology and facility type. For information sharing purposes, there are likely to be areas that are most valuable for operators of similar facilities, although many security issues can be discussed broadly.
Costs and Financing Start-up funding could be acquired through voluntary donations from industry, related government entities, NGOs, individuals, associations, professional organizations, and international organizations. WINS will generate sustained funding if it proves to contribute to the interests and values of the nuclear community.
In order for the entity to remain viable over time, we believe it will be important to create a sustainable funding stream. Contributions could be made through in-kind donations, up front commitments, sustaining commitments, and ad-hoc donations of These include, in particular, sensitivities about the sharing of security information between countries and organizations. This should not be an insurmountable barrier as the nature of WINS is not designed to be a public forum, nor is information about specific security measures in place at specific sites necessary.
It is also important to emphasize that participation in WINS will not mean the acceptance of new obligations on the part of facilities or organizations. The goal is information sharing and exchange, not imposing new security obligations. Finally, some potential participants have noted that there is no generally accepted economic rationale for participation, as there was in the case of safety concerns following the Chernobyl accident for establishment of WANO.
To this argument, we respond that the potential global economic costs of a nuclear terrorism event are likely to be substantial and the impact on the nuclear industry may be disproportionate to that experienced by industries in general. The international nuclear community should not wait for a security Chernobyl to take steps from preventing a terrorist from accessing nuclear material.
Twenty-five participants attended from 17 different countries and the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA , including government regulators, ministries, and private industry. At the conclusion of the meeting, there was general consensus on the need for WINS and the importance of continuing to advance the concept with support from NTI and other international partners. These activities will be developed through consultation with a number of international partners, including the facility operator communities. We hope to define and carry out a demonstration project in two areas in plutonium security and highly enriched uranium.
In the post Chernobyl years, waves of protest against nuclear power grew and swelled, leading to a strong overall slowdown for this reactor type. The SNR project in Germany never started up, and was shut down. The Generation IV initiative was the opportunity for global thinking about reactors for the future, referred to as fourth generation reactors.
Six reactor designs were selected, including the fast sodium reactor. However, after several years, most of the countries in or out of GENIV group have officially announced or confirmed that the fast sodium reactor is their priority reference design. In France, within the scope of the law of 28 June , the country has announced and confirmed the decision to build a prototype scheduled for operation in These and other plans are all sustained in a very practical manner by the ongoing production in the field. China is currently in the process of building a MWT research reactor, scheduled for divergence in In Japan, work is underway on MONJU for divergence in In India, a MWT power reactor is under construction, scheduled for divergence in September , the first of a three-reactor unit.
The stakes behind this renaissance in nuclear power are important indeed.
These fast reactors promise to produce world energy for thousands of years through breeding. No production of greenhouse gases. And long-life waste is burned. Moreover, significant progress has been made in terms of safety, reliability, availability and inspectability for this reactor type. A presentation is made on the experience gained at PHENIX since , and on the industrial validation during his operation, of the points described above. The enclosed table shows the number of years of operation for these 18 reactors, as of , and shows that accumulated operating experience comes to approximately years.
This has led to extremely significant feedback benefiting the fast sodium reactor type. However, no actual construction projects are underway simply the Kalimer research project. China: China continues its efforts in several fields, particularly in the HTR. However, a MWth sodium-cooled fast reactor is under construction, scheduled for divergence in CEFR China This prototype reactor has been described as the start of a series of this type of reactor.
India: India has long seen the fast reactor type as a long-term energy solution for the future. The FBTR reactor has been operational since 19 and has applied for a year lifetime extension. This experimental reactor is used to qualify materials and fuel. Russia: Here too, the choice of sodium reactors has long been made. The recent successful operations of the BN has led Russia to request an extension in the life of the reactor. Reactor divergence is scheduled for approximately However, Russia continues to work on the lead-cooled fast reactor option, which is the reactor type which equips the nuclear submarines.
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I53 Geneva K14 9th: Toki, Japan 12th: Toki, Japan A3 Proceedings of an advisory group meeting on atomic and molecular data for fusion organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency Abington, UK C6 P44 H43 Washington, D. S 2nd: Ontario, Canada P22 Beijing, China. E5 9th: Washington, D. S8 I57 2nd: Berlin, Germany "Superconducting quantum interference devices and their applications".
Call Number: TK I57 Italy P72 Nagoya, Japan Click here for access. Part B: vols.
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